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1.  What is an affordance? 
 The term affordance was coined by J. J. Gibson (e.g., Gibson, 1977)—a major proponent 
of ecological approaches to perception.  Although the specific meaning of this concept has 
evolved since its original inception (see Jones, 2003), a widely-accepted definition is that an 
affordance is a potential way of bodily interacting with an object that is evident to an animal on 
the basis of perception. In classic work on this topic, the most frequently discussed features of 
objects used to establish affordances are their surfaces, which yield information regarding 
size/shape properties, material, and objects' orientation relative to a perceiver. This information 
can be used to determine-- at least in part-- whether and how an object could be pushed or picked 
up with one or two hands, whether it could support the perceiver's body, and so on. However, 
more abstract information, including the conceptual category to which an object belongs, may 
also play a role-- a point that will be discussed shortly.  
 Although the focus of this chapter will be limited to affordances gleaned via vision 
(reflecting the standard approach within ecological psychology), it is worth noting that 
affordances can also be detected via other sensory modalities.  For example, haptic information 
acquired through manual exploration provides an obvious way to obtain various kinds of 
knowledge relevant to bodily interaction, such as when one navigates a room in the dark, or 
when a home renovator feels out whether a rickety old ladder is likely to support his or her 
weight.  Similarly, the specific "clunk" sound heard when an object is placed on a rigid surface 
can sometimes reflect the object’s mass, in turn yielding information about how an agent might 
interact with it.   
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 Exactly how do animals-- and humans in particular-- apprehend the affordances of an 
object?  This question is tied to a number of current and past debates in ecological psychology, 
and I will touch on only a few of the relevant issues here.  One key idea is that affordances are 
relativized to both the agent-perceiver and the immediate environment.  For instance, an object 
that could support the weight of a child would not necessarily hold the same affordances for an 
adult, nor would the same notion of support be relevant in zero gravity. Affordances therefore 
reflect a kind of situation-specific and complementary relation between a given organism and the 
environment (see Shaw & Turvey, 1981, for additional discussion).  As such, affordances are in 
principle quite different from what we consider to be the stable (perceiver- and context-invariant) 
attributes of individual objects, or the prototypical semantic properties associated with abstract 
object concepts.  Although this aspect of affordances is uncontroversial, the details regarding 
how this complementary relation is actually computed by an organism are not fully understood—
a point that becomes especially apparent when considering that actions performed by humans are 
often mediated and involve tools of various sorts (see, e.g., van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van 
Leeuwen, 1994). 
 A second issue concerns the extent to which affordances could be straightforwardly 
derived from sensory-perceptual information (the "ambient optic array") without some 
contribution from internal conceptual representations. I will illustrate this issue using an example 
appearing in some of Gibson's writings, namely the case of a mailbox, which is said to afford the 
action of mailing a letter (Gibson, 1979).  The relevant observation here is that this particular 
affordance seems difficult to arrive at simply on the basis of the surface features of a mailbox.  
To be sure, some outwardly-visible properties of a mailbox are important for establishing its 
potential for mailing letters, such as its apparent rigidity and the capacity to contain objects of a 
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certain size and shape.  However, these features are common to other kinds of containers and 
consequently do not distinguish mailboxes from things that do not afford letter mailing.  To 
identify the relevant affordance upon perceiving the mailbox, it seems necessary for a perceiver 
to also draw on stored background knowledge that allows him or her to (i) identify the specific 
object as an exemplar of the concept “mailbox”, and (ii) extend a (primary) function associated 
with “mailbox” to this specific exemplar.   
To some degree, Gibson's use of the mailbox example in his writings is surprising 
because his work reflected a generally negative view toward the need for internal representations 
(indeed, Gibson use of this example was not to illustrate the role of higher-level ontological 
influences). However, some authors have suggested that Gibson's approach to affordances was 
broader than his approach to other perceptual phenomena (see, e.g., Greeno, 1994).  Regardless, 
it is on this point that inconsistencies in the use of the term affordance are apparent in both 
scientific and philosophical literatures. In some cases, a strict sensory-based interpretation of the 
term is adopted, whereas in other cases affordances are clearly intended to reflect a perceiver's 
past experience and conceptual knowledge. To address this issue, contemporary research often 
acknowledges different subtypes of affordances.  Some of these subtypes relate to specific kinds 
of actions, such as the use of the term micro-affordance to describe the potential for a grasping 
gesture resulting from perceiving an object's size, shape, location, and orientation (e.g., Ellis & 
Tucker, 2000).  Other subtypes are distinguished by the origin and nature of the information used 
to establish the affordance.  For example, an episodic affordance has been used to describe a 
potentiation for action that is not stable, but which changes as a function of an object's relative 
location in space (e.g., determining whether left-handed vs. right-handed manipulation would be 
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more likely for a human agent to attempt, see Glenberg, Becker, Klötzer, Kolano, Müller & 
Rinck, 2009). 
A third question-- following on the heels of the idea that there are different subtypes of 
affordances-- is how different streams of information are prioritized or combined when a 
perceiver apprehends potential actions for objects.  Consistent with the familiar notion of 
priming, research has suggest that particular affordances can come to be more prominent than 
others simply as a result of their earlier consideration.  This can be shown in persistence effects 
whereby the classification of objects according to one affordance slows their subsequent 
classification using another affordance (Ye, Cardwell & Mark, 2009).  Another line of work 
explores possible a priori differences in the priority or status of certain subtypes of affordances.  
For example, one proposal is that more primitive (nonconceptual) affordances such as the 
assessment of graspability may be computed more quickly that affordances relying on stored 
knowledge (e.g, the characteristic function of a familiar tool-- see, e.g., Vingerhoets, Vandamme, 
& Vercammen, 2009). The relationship between certain kinds of affordances and conceptual 
information has also been explored in neuropsychological work.  For example, studies of 
perceptual deficits have illustrated cases where an individual's assessed knowledge of the 
appropriate actions for an object is relatively preserved despite an inability to correctly name the 
object, as well as the opposite pattern (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; Riddoch, Humphreys, & 
Price, 1989).  Interestingly, however, a judicious examination of these patterns does not seem to 
warrant the conclusion that informational streams operate fully autonomously, but instead are 
linked via rather complex forms of interaction (see Humphreys, 2001).    
Although the three themes mentioned above represent only a sampling of how 
affordances are explored in research on perception and action, they provide useful starting points 
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for considering the connection between affordances and language behaviour.  This is due to their 
relationship to central questions in studies of real-time sentence comprehension, namely the 
extent to which so-called core aspects of processing proceed with or without information from 
the specific situational context, the notion that processing is subserved by multiple information 
sources, and questions regarding the time-course and architecture underlying the combination of 
different informational streams.  These themes will be evident at various points in the review of 
studies that follows.   
 
2.  Affordances in visually situated language comprehension. 
 Visually situated language use differs from language occurring in other contexts in that it 
is used to denote entities, events, and states in the physical here-and-now.  In this circumstance, 
various kinds of information are available that are either unavailable or are less available in 
instances where language is not situated.  This includes details about the spatial position, size, 
and orientation of physical objects, as well as other outwardly-visible characteristics, all of 
which can be relevant for gauging the potential for certain forms of action.  Given the 
availability of this information, it seems reasonable to think that affordances may have a distinct 
and important role to play in these contexts.  What might this role be?  One (perhaps obvious) 
possibility is a reduction in the amount or kind of information that would otherwise be explicitly 
stated using language. However, an effect of this type is probably not specific to affordances in 
particular, but would apply generally to any kind of information acquired via vision (e.g., the 
color of objects) or other sensory modalities.  A more specific consequence that is explored in 
much of the research described below is that visually derived potentiations for action can 
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somehow help structure the nonlinguistic context, or domain of interpretation that sets bounds on 
interpretation of linguistic expressions.   
Before venturing into this discussion, I will note that it is important to be mindful about 
core differences between perception and language, and to consider these carefully when 
reflecting on how affordances might be “plugged in” to language processes.  For example, 
language is extremely nubile when it comes to the matter of perspective.  Events can be 
expressed in the first, second, or third person, via direct or indirect quotation, and in ways that 
highlight either the endpoint or the starting point of actions (e.g., Helmut gave Zelda a letter vs. 
Zelda received a letter from Helmut).  Affordances, on the other hand, are by definition a first 
person phenomenon: our apprehension of objects, participants, and potential actions within a 
visual scene is not the same as for other perceivers, and this apprehension will reflect the 
particular perspective delivered to the brain by our sensory systems.  As a result, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that genuine affordances (as construed within work on perception) would 
be relevant to only selected aspects of situated language processing.  Although cases involving 
second- or third-person effects (e.g., a sensitivity to the affordances apprehended by another 
individual) are interesting to consider, they cannot stem from precisely the same sensory-
perceptual origins and instead will depend on higher-order representational systems that can 
yield a “simulated” perspective. 
 i. Mapping referring expressions to real-world referents 
 Referential expressions such as the dog or the fork on the left are interpreted against a 
circumscribed context (domain of interpretation) that sets limits on the nature and range of 
referential candidates for an expression as well as the contrasting alternatives that motivate the 
speaker's use of a particular description.  In visually situated contexts, the set of perceptible 
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entities provides one obvious source of information for defining the domain of interpretation.  
Research has shown, however, that this is only a starting point, and the linguistically relevant 
domain for the semantics of a given expression is typically narrower than what is provided by 
the objects that have been visually indexed within a given scene.  For example, there is now 
considerable evidence that information about actions and events that is encountered elsewhere in 
an utterance provides important constraints on the extent of the domain used in the interpretation 
of referring expressions.  To illustrate, Altmann and Kamide (1999) examined how verbs in 
sentences such as The boy will eat the cake can influence referential interpretation in advance of 
hearing the noun. Listeners heard these types of sentences while viewing schematic scenes 
composed of clip-art images (see the chapters by Spivey & Huette and Pykkönnen & Crocker for 
additional discussion of the general methodological paradigm).  The pattern of eye movements 
showed that listeners could use verb information to anticipate the referent in situations where 
only one scene object was compatible with the verb-evoked action (e.g., in a scene with only one 
edible object, given the verb eat). This suggests that event information in an unfolding utterance 
is used incrementally to (re-) define the contextual domain of interpretation, a concept that 
evokes a general theory of contextual "bookkeeping" advocated earlier by theorists such as 
Ballmer (1981): 
The general setting for bookkeeping is the following:  linguistic expressions to be 
interpreted are analyzed from left to right.  Single words or morphemes […] 
operate as linguistic instruments on the contextual aspects or parameters.  These 
contextual aspects are conceived as sets [...]  There are various explicit or implicit 
changes which may be induced by the interpretation of the simple linguistic 
expressions (morphemes, words, maybe phrases) on the context parameters. (p. 
39) 
 
However, it would be premature to conclude that the effect of event information in this 
case necessarily reflects the influence of affordances.  For example, one alternative explanation 
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involves the notion of selectional restrictions— linguistically encoded well-formedness 
constraints on the combination of sentence elements (in this case, certain verb-noun pairings). A 
similar explanation is that the effect could be driven by stored and abstracted conceptual 
knowledge of the co-occurrences between actions and certain kinds of entities. For both of these 
explanations, the nature and source of the relevant information differs from a genuine affordance 
in that it abstracted and mentally stored.  In other words, there is no evidence that comprehenders 
were computing the kind of "situation-specific" and "complementary" action relation between 
agents and the environment that characterizes an affordance as the term is understood within 
ecological perception.  Another important point here is that the listener's own capacity for the 
denoted action (e.g., eating the cake) is not relevant.  Rather, the listener is interpreting the 
described action in relation to a third-person participant mentioned in the discourse.  This also 
limits the ability to understand the effect in terms of affordances. 
 A study by Kako and Trueswell (2000) using a more situated and first person 
experimental methodology provides an interesting analogue to Altmann and Kamide (1999).  In 
this study, participants followed spoken instructions to execute an action involving one of several 
real objects located on a table top (e.g., Now I want you to fold/pick up the towel).  As in 
Altmann and Kamide, the verb was manipulated such that it might be compatible with only the 
intended referent (e.g., fold) or all the objects present (e.g., pick up). The results were largely 
congruent with those from Altmann and Kamide's storyboard-like look-and-listen technique.  At 
the verb, listeners rapidly narrowed consideration to action-compatible referents, allowing 
anticipatory identification of the intended target when only this object was compatible with the 
action.  However, although Kako and Trueswell's experimental scenario does involve actual 
actions that are evaluated and executed by the perceiver/listener, it is still possible that mentally 
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stored information (selectional restrictions or conceptual associations) serves as the principal 
driver of the effect.  To test whether affordances have an independent influence on referential 
interpretation in visual contexts, it seems necessary to examine cases involving idiosyncratic 
physical properties that are not among the properties that seem likely to be stored as part of the 
abstract conceptual representation for an object category.   
 In a study similar to Kako and Trueswell (2000), Chambers, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, 
Carlson and Filip (2002) used instructions whose predicate terms were of the type put X inside Y.  
Unlike lexically rich terms such as eat or fold, the lexical constraints stemming from the 
predicate information are comparatively uninformative in terms of co-occurrence associations 
with particular noun phrase referents.  However, similar to the effect found with more lexically 
rich terms like eat or fold, interpretation at the point of the preposition inside showed rapidly-
defined expectations for referents with action-relevant properties (namely open containers).  
Further, a clear influence of idiosyncratic physical affordances was found when the object array 
contained multiple containers matching the target name.  Figure 1 depicts an example trial from 
the relevant experiment in which the corresponding instruction was Pick up the cube.  Now put it 
inside the can.  If we assume that the linguistically relevant domain is defined using the visually-
present object array and the predicate information in the instruction (limiting the domain to those 
objects that are capable of containment), the second part of the instruction should be formally 
ambiguous due to the lack of a unique referent for the expression the can.  However, one of the 
experimental manipulations varied the size of the theme object (the cube) such that it could or 
could not fit inside the smaller member of the target pair.  When a small version of the theme 
object was used, listeners' eye movements and behavioral responses reflected the apparent 
ambiguity such that consideration of both cans was evident (and listeners were unsure what to 
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do).  In contrast, when a large theme object was used (entailing that the smaller container no 
longer afforded the action evoked by the verb) the smaller alternative was excluded from the 
referential domain of interpretation, allowing the instruction to became functionally 
unambiguous. In this case, listeners' eye movements and actions showed no difficulty in 
selecting the intended target referent. 
 An additional manipulation involved using indefinite noun phrases in the second part of 
the instruction (e.g., Pick up the cube.  Now put it inside a can). This was included to more 
firmly establish that the restricted domain reflected in the participants' actions is truly reflective 
of the mental representation used in the semantic evaluation of linguistic expressions, and does 
not simply reflect a type of task-based strategic response.  Importantly, the felicity conditions 
resulting from the multi-referent context and the imperative put_inside instruction encourage a 
so-called "choice" interpretation for the indefinite noun phrase, such that it might be paraphrased 
as one of the bowls, which clearly presupposes the presence of multiple bowls. (Notice the 
interpretation here is distinct from indefinites in sentences such as There is a strange man at the 
door.)  If the affordance-based exclusion of the smaller candidate referent genuinely reflects the 
linguistic domain used in defining the scope of the indefinite, listeners should experience 
confusion when the visual context contains the large version of the theme object.  Indeed, this is 
what the data showed, suggesting that affordance-defined domains for action in this situation are 
in fact the same domains used in the semantic evaluation of linguistic elements.   
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Figure 1: Example object array from Chambers et al. (2002), Experiment 2 (reprinted with 
permission). 
 
Although not all instances of situated language use are likely to involve fully isomorphic 
domains-for-action and domains-for-language, the findings in this experiment provide useful 
starting points for additional exploration of this issue.  The outcomes also highlight a clear back-
and-forth interplay between linguistic and scene-based information sources to define the 
circumscribed attentional set.  First, the visual scene provides a starting point by setting out the 
number and kinds of entities present.  The predicate information, when heard, combines with this 
information to restrict consideration to container objects. Once this information (and the 
corresponding action) is known, another kind of scene-based information comes into play, 
namely the volumetric cues that allow an apprehension on the part of the listener as to which 
objects possess the relevant affordances for the evoked action.  The interpretation of the 
subsequent linguistic expression is then guided by this information.  It seems then that 
representations of the "context" and the "utterance" are shifting together in time in a kind of 
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lockstep relationship, where changes in one type of representation are spurred on by changes in 
the other.  This situation illustrates a central tenet in Dynamical Systems approaches to 
cognition, namely that intelligent behavior is subserved by the continuous interaction of multiple 
tightly interconnected representations that co-evolve in time (e.g., van Gelder & Port, 1995). 
 
 ii.  Recognizing spoken words 
 We have seen evidence that the mapping of linguistic expressions to nonlinguistic entities 
can be influenced by the perception of the affordances of these entities in relation to expressed 
actions.  However, an important focus of research on real-time language comprehension 
concerns whether and how contextual factors penetrate into so-called core components of 
language understanding such as word recognition and computing the syntactic configuration of 
sentence elements.  In classic frameworks, these processes have often been described as 
informationally encapsulated.  On this account, the early moments of comprehension are free 
from the influence of contextual (nonlinguistic) information sources.  Instead, these contextual 
constraints are integrated with the products of the initial processing phase only during a later 
time window.   
When it comes to spoken word recognition, although the specific details vary across 
theoretical frameworks, most of these approaches assume that the recognition process is 
characterized by two features: the incremental uptake of information from the unfolding speech 
signal, and a competitive matching process in which information from the signal is dynamically 
evaluated against stored word forms in the mental lexicon.  To illustrate, upon reaching the 
midpoint of the unfolding word shark, information in the signal provides a certain amount of 
evidence for a range of lexical alternatives including not only shark but sharp, shard, spark, 
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dark, etc.  As each successive speech sound unfolds, the activation level of certain alternatives 
will be increased or reduced based on their cumulative match or mismatch with the available 
input.  
 One way to directly evaluate claims about informational encapsulation in word 
recognition is to test the potential for contextual constraints to limit the set of active lexical 
competitors as their incremental evaluation proceeds in time.  Evidence from studies of spoken 
language in visually situated contexts has in fact provided evidence against a strong version of 
the encapsulation account.  For example, event information from verbs encountered earlier can 
be used to reduce the consideration of phonetically similar word candidates as the signal unfolds 
in time (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2004; Chambers & Cooke, 2009).  However, predicate terms 
whose effects can be defined in terms of affordance-based information could provide an even 
more compelling case (due to the lack of other semantic associations between predicate terms 
and noun complements), and a clearer demonstration of cross-modal influences (i.e., the 
penetration of information from outside so-called language modules). 
 Revill, Tanenhaus, and Aslin (2008) tested this possibility in a study in which 
participants were first taught a novel lexicon that included words for complex geometric shapes 
as well as words for actions that could be performed on these shapes such as inducing movement 
(e.g., horizontal oscillation, clockwise rotation) and changing a shape's color/texture (e.g., grey-
to-white, grey to speckled).  The use of an artificial lexicon allowed the authors to stringently 
control for characteristics of the various words, including the number of alternatives whose 
sound pattern overlapped with a given target word (i.e., lexical neighborhoods), building on a 
methodology used by Magnuson, Tanenhaus, Aslin, and Dahan (2003).  Notional affordances for 
the shapes were taught to participants during an initial training phase.  For example, participants 
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might learn that shapes composed of straight lines could undergo movement changes but not 
texture changes.  During the test phase of the experiment, listeners viewed displays on a 
computer screen that contained a selection of the geometric objects and various icons denoting 
different possible actions.  For each display, they heard a recorded instruction consisting of an 
action word followed by an object word, and responded by clicking on the relevant action icon 
and then the denoted object.  Eye movement data showed that the newly learned affordances 
influenced the extent to which a competitor (e.g., a straight-edged bupa) was visually considered 
as a target shape whose name had overlapping speech sounds (e.g., a rounded-edged bupo) was 
heard in the unfolding instruction.  For example, if the required action could be afforded by the 
bupo, but not the bupa, consideration of the latter was significantly reduced as the word bupo 
unfolded in time, despite the overlapping “bu” sounds.   
 More subtle measures of the influence of affordance information on bottom-up aspects of 
word recognition were then obtained by exploring target fixations in situations where 
competitors were not present in the visual display.  Previous eye tracking research has shown 
that the visual identification of targets with dense lexical neighborhoods (i.e., target words with 
many similar-sounding phonological neighbors) is slowed compared to those with sparse 
neighborhoods, even though these alternatives are not visually present (e.g., Magnuson, Dixon, 
Tanenhaus & Aslin, 2007).  This reflects the implicit competition mechanisms referred to earlier: 
when the set of similar-sounding alternatives is larger, the activation level associated with each 
candidate is correspondingly lower in a roughly zero-sum manner, thereby delaying the point at 
which a target candidate eventually reaches threshold on the basis of the unfolding input.  Of 
interest was whether this effect was modulated when some of the target word's phonological 
neighbors denoted objects that could not afford the action described by the action term. In other 
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words, can the affordance information evoked by the action term work to reduce the size of the 
implicit competitor set by limiting the bottom-up activation of certain lexical candidates?  The 
results indicated that the information provided by the affordance constraints did indeed work to 
suppress competition stemming from non-displayed competitors, demonstrating the involvement 
of affordance-based considerations in core aspects of language processing. 
 
 iii. Computing syntactic relationships 
Temporary linguistic indeterminacy is not limited to the unfolding of spoken words but is 
also an element of real-time comprehension at the syntactic level.  As utterances are encountered 
in time, the grammatical relationships among entire words and phrases are often compatible with 
multiple structural analyses. To illustrate, the phrase underlined in the unfolding utterance The 
baker poured the egg in the bowl...  may indicate the location where an egg is being poured, or 
may serve to indicate which of several eggs is intended.   Information following the 
indeterminate phrase often disambiguates the intended grammatical relationship (e.g., …while 
stirring continuously vs. …over the flour).   A substantial body of evidence has shown that 
listeners typically assign a provisional grammatical analysis to ambiguous phrases as soon as 
they are encountered, rather than waiting for disambiguating language.  One of the core goals of 
research on syntactic-level comprehension is to characterize the kinds of information used to 
make these provisional decisions, and to understand how these information sources are 
integrated in real time as an utterance unfolds.  
In many cases, comprehenders' initial understanding of an ambiguous phrase can be 
linked to the fact that the phrase follows a singular definite noun phrase (e.g., the egg in the 
preceding example).  These expressions are typically used to refer to a uniquely identifiable 
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referent, and the amount of descriptive information necessary to achieve this goal will depend on 
the presence of other possible candidates in the referential context. Whether or not there is an 
expectation for additional descriptive information can influence the grammatical role initially 
assigned to an ambiguous phrase (see, e.g., Crain & Steedman, 1985). For example, if several 
eggs are present, comprehenders will initially interpret the in the bowl in The baker poured the 
egg in the bowl… as a modifying phrase because the simpler description the egg is not sufficient 
to specify which egg is intended. In contrast, if only a single egg is present, information of this 
sort would not be necessary and comprehenders would initially understand the phrase as 
indicating the intended location.  But how does this "number of potential referents" phenomenon 
link up to the perception of affordances? 
Recall that the evidence discussed earlier shows that listener/perceivers use lexical 
semantics in combination with visually defined affordances to restrict the visual scene to 
compatible referential candidates, and that these restricted domains are used to determine the 
potential uniqueness of entities in relation to a definite expression. It follows, then, that 
affordances may play a role in influencing expectations about whether additional information is 
required to achieve referential success as the components of a description are successively 
encountered.   In one study, Chambers, Tanenhaus and Magnuson (2004) recorded eye 
movements as listeners followed instructions to interact with real objects in a visual display.  
Instructions were of the type Pour the egg in the bowl over the flour, where the first prepositional 
phrase (in the bowl) is temporarily ambiguous with respect to its syntactic role (location vs. 
modifier).  The important manipulation in the visual display was whether both visually present 
candidates (e.g., an egg in a bowl and an egg in a glass, see Figure 2) could afford the described 
action (e.g., they were both in liquid form) or whether only one candidate possessed the relevant 
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affordance (i.e., the egg in the glass was still in the shell and hence unpourable).  The critical 
measure was whether listeners initially misinterpreted the ambiguous phrase as specifying the 
intended destination, as measured by whether they fixated the empty bowl (the “false” 
destination for the object to be moved) upon hearing the ambiguous phrase in the unfolding 
instruction.  The results showed that a destination interpretation was adopted when only one 
referential candidate afforded the described action.  When both alternatives were compatible, a 
modifier interpretation was adopted, and fixations to the false destination were no more than 
what was observed when the instruction was linguistically unambiguous (e.g., Pour the egg 
that's in the bowl over the flour.).   
 Apart from illustrating the role of affordances in core aspects of syntactic processing, the 
outcomes help address a question that was left only partially answered in other work.  Although 
affordances were shown to constrain the domain of interpretation for simple definite referring 
expressions (Chambers et al., 2002), one might argue that a modified description would have 
been more expected or effective (e.g., Now put it inside the large can would be a more felicitous 
instruction corresponding to Figure 1, even when it was clear that the smaller can in the display 
could not afford the denoted action).  The results from the "pour the egg" study suggest that this 
is not the case.  Specifically, listeners actually dispreferred a modifier interpretation for the in the 
bowl phrase when only one of the two lexically-compatible candidates was physically 
compatible with the stated action, and instead temporarily misinterpreted this phrase as 
specifying the intended destination.  This outcome reinforces the idea that the circumscribed 
domain for planning and executing actions appears to be the same domain used in the semantic 
evaluation of linguistic expressions, at least in these types of situations. 
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The finding that the domain-restricting effect of affordances operates rapidly enough to 
influence both incremental spoken word recognition and real-time syntactic processing has clear 
implications for our understanding of the mental architecture underlying language 
comprehension processes.  As mentioned before, results from earlier studies, as well as 
prominent theoretical frameworks, had championed the idea that the early moments of 
processing drew only on selected information sources intrinsic to the linguistic system.  The 
immediate influence of informational constraints that are clearly nonlinguistic in nature (i.e., 
provided by a different sensory modality) and which reflect broader behavioral goals (i.e., the 
intention to execute a spoken instruction by means of physical action) provides a significant 
challenge to this view. These findings are instead consistent with the idea that the coordination of 
information during real-time language comprehension is opportunistic-- drawing on any relevant 
cues according to their availability-- and is characterized by highly parallel processing such that 
various information streams are integrated seamlessly as words and sentences unfold.  
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 iv.  Interpreting language in conversational contexts 
To this point, the role of affordances in visually situated language comprehension has 
been illustrated in experiments where the assessment of potential actions is made by a lone 
perceiver operating within a physical environment containing a number of objects and little else.  
In these studies, language is provided via recorded speech or an experimenter who is not visible 
within the contextual environment and who is not interacting with the listener/perceiver in any 
real sense.  With this in mind, it is important to recall that the traditional definition of an 
affordance involves a consideration of the bodily capacities of an organism in relation to a 
perceived environment, where “environment” is understood in a reasonably broad sense, and not 
just an array of manipulable objects. In the canonical situated setting for communication, the 
environment includes other individuals, namely other conversational participants.  A 
consideration of this kind of context provides an opportunity to examine affordances from yet 
another angle.  In particular, we can ask how the presence of another individual creates 
additional and possibly more complex kinds of potential actions whose detection nonetheless 
occurs via perception. 
At perhaps the most coarse-grained level, one type of potential action created through the 
presence of an interlocutor is simply the basic act of beginning to speak, or, more specifically, 
assuming the role of speaker within the regime of conversational turn taking (see Greeno, 1994).  
During conversation, speakers produce certain perceptible linguistic and nonlinguistic behaviors 
that help to signal the end of their conversational turn such as pausing, slowing of speech rate, 
and a drop of pitch, as well as changes in gesture and gaze behavior.  These physical cues can 
lead the perceiver (in the current role of listener) to calculate the point at which to effect a certain 
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kind of action, namely to take over as the active speaker.  The management of conversational 
turn taking can therefore be argued to involve the detection of affordances at some level.   
A topic that builds more directly on the findings discussed earlier concerns the 
perceiver/listener's apprehension of the actions available to another individual, and how this 
might influence aspects of language understanding.  Such a process would obviously depend on 
certain representational transformations in the sense that it no longer involves detecting 
potentiations for action from a first-person perspective.  In one study, Hanna and Tanenhaus 
(2004, see also the chapter by Brown-Schmidt, this volume, for related work) conducted an 
experiment varying the spatial accessibility of objects in relation to the potential actions of a 
speaker, and examined how this influences the mapping of definite referring expressions to these 
objects.  In the experiment, participants assisted a confederate (playing the role of “cook”) in the 
task of following a recipe. The materials for the recipe were spread across a physical workspace 
such that some in the participant’s area, others were in the cook’s area, and some were accessible 
to both.  The cook provided the participant with a series of instructions, some of which were 
referentially ambiguous, e.g., Could you put the cake mix next to the mixing bowl?, spoken when 
two boxes of cake mix were physically present. In the critical test conditions, one of the two 
potential referents was reachable to the participant, and the other was reachable to the cook. 
Further, the instruction was spoken at a moment when the cook’s hands were either empty or 
happened to be occupied with the task of holding a tray. This manipulation varied the presence 
of an action-based cue that could potentially restrict the domain of interpretation for the listener. 
Specifically, when the cook’s hands were empty, a participant should infer that the intended 
referent is the one in the participant's own area, because it would be implausible for the cook to 
request an object that she could actually reach herself.  However, when the cook’s hands were 
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full, her capacity to reach either cake mix is impeded, and consequently both alternatives become 
a plausible candidate for the expression (making the expression referentially ambiguous).  
Eye movement data, as well as participants' overt behaviors, suggested that the referential 
domain of interpretation was indeed quickly defined on the basis of these ascribed affordances, 
in combination with assumptions of cooperative communication.  Thus, the actions we perceive 
as being available to other individuals are used to define linguistically relevant domains of 
interpretation.  As mentioned earlier, however, this outcome is likely to be the product of 
comparatively more complicated forms of mental representations compared to the “first person” 
apprehension of affordances.  This particular point is substantiated by developmental patterns in 
the time course of processing. Although the behavior and overall gaze patterns of 3- and 4-year-
olds in the same kind of experimental task are like those observed in adults by Hanna and 
Tanenhaus (2004), children’s eye movement patterns in the very earliest moments of processing 
did not reflect the same ability to rapidly restrict the domain of interpretation (Collins, Graham, 
& Chambers, 2012).  
 In the case of conversational interaction, the actions that are perceptible to a 
listener/perceiver also include actions produced by a speaker that involve the actual mechanics of 
speech production.  If listener/perceivers routinely take into account the actions available to other 
individuals, it is therefore plausible that something perceived as impeding the speaker's 
articulatory processes could correspondingly affect the comprehender's interpretation of sounds 
being produced.  In an intriguing study of perceptual learning, Kraljic, Samuel and Brennan 
(2008) examined the influence of this type of information.  The authors' starting point was an 
established re-tuning effect that occurs when listeners accommodate to idiosyncratic speaker-
based variation in the pronunciation of speech sounds.  In one condition, participants viewed an 
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audiovisual recording of a speaker who tended to pronounce words in a way where the sound /s/ 
was more "sh"-like than the articulatory standard.  With repeated exposures, this resulted in a 
boundary adjustment in the phonetic category such that the listener identified "sh"-shaded tokens 
as belonging to the /s/ category.  Critically, however, this perceptual learning effect was blocked 
when visual information allowed the speaker's pronunciation patterns to be attributed to an 
incidental cause, namely a pen that the speaker happened to have in her mouth when uttering /s/-
containing words.  (The audio track in the videorecording was the same as for the "pen-free" 
condition, ensuring that any difference in learning patterns could not be attributed to differences 
in the acoustic signal.)  This outcome provides yet another perspective on how perceived 
capacities for action can penetrate into core linguistic processing. 
 
3.  Are affordances really the right explanatory concept? 
 To this point I have not discussed another body of research that draws on the notion of 
affordances, namely the burgeoning literature exploring the embodiment of language processes.  
Most generally, this work adopts a perspective in which semantic-conceptual meanings are 
understood to be "grounded" in perception, and language comprehension is thought to involve a 
process of covert perceptual and/or motor simulation in response to described entities and events 
(see Zwaan & Kaschak, 2009 for an overview).  Although this approach stands in contrast to 
frameworks assuming highly abstracted and amodal propositional structures, it reflects a strong 
degree of continuity with Mental Models accounts, which have frequently appealed to aspects of 
perception to characterize the mental representations generated from language (e.g., spatial 
location, attentional focus, foregrounding/backgrounding, perspective, among others: see 
Garnham & Oakhill, 1996; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The specific role 
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of affordances in the embodied approach is evident in studies examining combinatorial meaning 
in sentences, where the goal is to understand how comprehenders establish links between 
denoted actions or states and the individuals and objects involved in these eventualities.  For 
example, Glenberg and colleagues (e.g., Glenberg & Robertson, 1999, 2000; Kaschak & 
Glenberg, 2000) have argued that mental simulations for the affordances of linguistically-evoked 
entities are used to "mesh" representations of these entities with described actions, and that this 
process provides a superior account to other accounts of how these semantic linkages are 
identified (e.g., those based on distributional co-occurrence statistics or abstract propositional 
representations).   
Despite the thematic similarities, there are several ways in which this body of research 
reflects a focus that is distinct from the work reviewed so far in the current chapter and the 
general theme of this book.  For example, the studies mentioned in the preceding sections reflect 
a position in which perceptual information and its corollaries function as an accompanying 
stream of information derived from the co-present visual context, rather than an outcome of 
language interpretation (i.e., a perceptually-rich internal simulacrum of a described state or 
event).  This is not to say, however, that these studies described in this chapter endorse the idea 
that mental representations of language are disembodied in the sense of being abstract 
propositional structures, etc. It is possible, for instance, that the rapid integration of linguistic and 
visual information is subserved in part by shared systems and/or representational formats (see, 
e.g., Spivey & Richardson, 2009).  Another difference is that work on the embodiment of 
language tends to be more concerned with the more final representational instantiations of 
sentences, rather than the on-line processes that handle temporally evolving (and hence 
incomplete/indeterminate) linguistic input.  This distinction may be best appreciated as a matter 
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of degree rather than an absolute, but it is nonetheless important in understanding the goals that 
motivate the respective approaches to understanding language comprehension mechanisms.  
What embodied approaches can directly contribute to the current question is to encourage 
us to more stringently consider what it means if affordances can also influence language 
interpretation in a simulated form, in the absence of concurrent visual processing. One (perhaps 
too easy?) conclusion is that studies of embodied language and visually situated language 
together yield a unified and consistent empirical argument highlighting the importance of 
affordances for comprehension processes.  Another response is to consider instead the 
differences across these kinds of studies, and whether these differences point to a common 
denominator that is in fact less tied to aspects of sensory-perceptual information.  We have 
already broached the question, for instance, of whether the direct apprehension of affordances in 
the "cognition-free" manner suggested by Gibson is in fact possible, and it seems clear that the 
mental simulation of affordances during discourse comprehension will also necessarily involve 
higher-order mechanisms.  The studies discussed in the preceding sections also reveal ways in 
which higher cognition is involved in the perception of action-relevant properties (even in 
visually-situated contexts).  This was evident in studies where affordances are calculated in 
relation to the speaker's actions (Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004), or to third person clip-art characters 
(Altmann & Kamide, 1999, and others). Yet another example comes from work showing that 
two-dimensional clip-art images of objects can evoke information about the typical mode of 
manipulating objects.  For example, an image of a piano evokes the manual behaviors involved 
in using the real-world analogue of that object, and in turn activates the concept typewriter due to 
the common mode of bodily interaction (Myung, Blumstein & Sedivy, 2006; see also Yee, 
Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011).  This phenomenon neatly bridges the kinds of effects 
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observed in studies using visually-present real objects and those found in work studying 
linguistically-driven mental simulations of affordance information.  
If, then, affordances in language comprehension are (in many cases) tinged by influences 
of higher-level cognition, it may make sense to consider whether there is anything special about 
these affordances per se, or whether they simply provide a particularly accessible demonstration 
of the idea that real-time language understanding is ultimately an act of recognizing the 
communicative intent of an individual, and that linguistic information is supplemented by 
detailed forms of nonlinguistic information in achieving this goal.  One way to address this 
question is to evaluate the primacy of sensory-perceptual information in relation to other 
information sources in the interpretation of natural language.  This typically requires the use of 
linguistic stimuli containing more semantically- or pragmatically-nuanced lexical items or 
constructions that can reveal the potential for visually based information to be modulated or 
suppressed.  
 One study of visually situated language that provides some relevant data is an exploration 
of linguistic contrast by Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, and Carlson (1999).  As background, the 
claim that language is "modal" and involves rich and detailed perceptual simulations would seem 
to commit us to the idea that representations generated on the basis of language are perceptually 
specific as opposed to abstract.  It is thus reasonable to think that the internal representations for 
linguistic descriptions such as heavy book, dog, new shoes, etc. would involve some kind of 
well-defined visual exemplar.  On this assumption, it would follow that there should be some 
detectable penalty when the referent of a linguistic description is not an ideal fit with this 
perceptual representation.  Such a penalty was indeed detected in the Sedivy et al. study. 
Specifically, upon hearing a sentence such as Pick up the tall glass, listeners were slower to 
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fixate the target object in the display when it was a fairly normal-sized glass, compared to one 
that was perceptibly taller than an average glass (and would therefore be a better referent for the 
description tall glass).   
However, an important finding in the study involved a situation in which the target glass 
was accompanied by a smaller contrasting glass in the visual scene.  In this case, the specific size 
of the target referent glass no longer seemed to matter: listeners were as fast to identify it 
regardless of whether it was/was not an average glass or tall glass relative to the category norm.  
This reflects the pragmatic conditions of use for dimensional modifiers like tall: speakers tend to 
include them in referring expressions to differentiate objects from one another in a relative way 
rather than to simply ascribe some stable property to an entity.  At a minimum, this suggests that 
the semantics and pragmatics of natural language can mute the importance of certain kinds of 
perceptual information, such as stored visual standards for object categories.  
Other work has used the phenomenon of referential anticipation to explore the extent to 
which perceptual information plays a dominant role in referential processing.  Chambers and San 
Juan (2009) investigated the interpretation of the transitive verb return in instructions such as 
Now return the square to area 3, occurring within a sequence of several instructions.  Like the 
verb move, return expresses an overt physical action involving concrete objects, making it 
relevant for exploring the topic of perceptually grounded aspects of language interpretation.  
However, it is also clearly a presuppositional term, whose semantics requires a particular 
background condition to have been satisfied (namely the previous displacement of the denoted 
object).  These types of expressions provide an opportunity to explore the influence of other 
kinds of constraints alongside perceptual and action-defined information.  
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The study revealed that, even in the earliest moments of comprehending the verb, the 
consideration of referential candidates was influenced by various nonperceptual factors including 
the inferred purpose behind the original object displacement, and whether an earlier 
displacement was considered to be relevant to communicative goals. For instance, when a 
participant had to move a certain display object "incidentally" to enable an object of interest to 
continue along a particular path, the incidentally-moved object was not considered when 
listeners heard the verb in a subsequent Now return the… instruction, even though this object 
unambiguously satisfied the perceptual-level affordances for the verb return (i.e., it was 
known/perceived to be previously displaced just seconds before).  The perceptually defined 
affordance of "being returnable" was apparently muted for this object by higher-level factors 
pertaining to goal relevance.   
These results, as well as findings from some other visually situated studies (see, e.g., 
Altmann & Kamide, 2009; Wolter, Skovbroten Gorman & Tanenhaus, 2011), indicate that the 
use of perceptually-derived information can be readily suppressed in reaction to certain semantic, 
pragmatic, and discourse-based requirements during language interpretation. At the same time 
however, other work has illustrated situations where perceptually derived information trumps 
other potentially relevant knowledge for processes such as the linking of actions to entities (e.g., 
overruling stored stereotypic associations between specific actions and event participants, see 
Knoeferle & Crocker, 2007). Taken together, these studies highlight the need for a coherent 
middle ground that more readily acknowledges the fact that the same information can have 
different effects in different circumstances. In some cases, this approach will require more 
attention to the diversity of meanings expressed in natural language, (particularly those that do 
not relate to aspects of perception or action).  On other cases, this will likely require careful 
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thinking about the nature of experimental tasks and their relationship with the range of goals and 
behaviors found in real-world communicative contexts. 
 
4.  Summary 
 The notion of affordances is explicitly and implicitly present in a broad range of 
experimental studies of situated language comprehension.  This concept has informed research 
on both specific and general topics, including modularity in core linguistic processing, the 
question of how linguistically-relevant context is defined (and re-defined over time), the real-
time integration of qualitatively different types of information, the linking of referential entities 
to predicate terms, and the content of mental representations for language. It is unclear at this 
point, however, whether affordances-- and other perceptually-derived information-- play a 
particularly distinct and privileged role in language processes (even in visually situated 
situations), or whether they just provide a particularly salient illustration of the fluid and 
contextually-sensitive character of the human capacity to interpret language in real time.  What is 
clear, in contrast, is that the recent interest in affordances marks an important shift towards 
appreciating idiosyncratic features of objects and events in aspects of language understanding.  
The fact that this interest accompanies the increasing use of methodologies for studying visually 
situated spoken language is not surprising.  In reading paradigms, it is difficult to provide 
detailed information about the nature of denoted entities and actions, in part because of the 
obvious need to provide more text (thereby increasing the length of each trial and consequently 
limiting the number of observations and/or conditions) and also because the explicit provision of 
this information may lead to unwanted inferences about its importance or relevance. Standard 
theoretical models for phenomena such as linguistic reference have also been somewhat 
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restricted when it comes to the situation-specific features of actions, states and entities.  For 
example, the framework provided by representational models such as Discourse Representation 
Theory (Kamp & Reyle, 1993) tends to adopt a comparatively atomic representation of referents, 
rather than a more molecular view in which these referents are represented along with their 
various attributes, including idiosyncratic properties. Visually based psycholinguistic paradigms, 
in contrast, demonstrate how this information comes to be incorporated into mental 
representations without effort or fanfare, as a basic by-product of perceiving the broader 
contextual environment in which language occurs. 
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